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The concept of “fact” has a history. Over the past centuries, physicists have appropriated it
in various ways. In this article, we compare Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein’s interpreta-
tions of the concept. Mach, like most nineteenth-century German physicists, contrasted fact
and theory. He understood facts as real and complex combinations of natural events.
Theories, in turn, only served to order and communicate facts efficiently. Einstein’s concept
of fact was incompatible with Mach’s, since Einstein believed facts could be theoretical too,
just as he ascribed mathematical theorizing a leading role in representing reality. For
example, he used the concept of fact to refer to a generally valid result of experience. The
differences we disclose between Mach and Einstein were symbolic for broader tensions in
the German physics discipline. Furthermore, they underline the historically fluid character
of the category of the fact, both within physics and beyond.
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Introduction
In recent years, supporters of science have been on the barricades defending the
authority of science and its facts. Among the slogans of the 2017March for Science
were expressions such as “trust scientific facts, not alternative facts” and “science
is not an alternative fact” (figure 1). The message behind these slogans seems
straightforward, but is actually complex when we realize that there have been and
still are many different ideas about what a “fact” is. Illustratively, the Oxford
English Dictionary lists ten separate entries for “fact,” and there are many subtle
differences within these entries. Definitions range from “the sum of circumstances
and incidents of a case, looked at apart from their legal bearing” to “that which is
known (or firmly believed) to be real or true.”1
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Although various knowledge disciplines claim to rely on facts, great differences
exist between the specific meanings of a “fact” in different disciplines. As Lorraine
Daston has also noted, a physiological experiment and a sociological questionnaire
seem to establish very different things, “but in both cases they are said to provide
‘facts.’”2 Likewise, history and physics are both fact-oriented disciplines, but the
facts of history and the facts of physics are of a different kind.3 Interpretations of
the concept of fact do not only vary between disciplines, but also within the very
same discipline, or even inside a single research institute. In contemporary particle
physics, for example, some understand a “fact” to be an explanation for or gen-
eralization of particular experimental phenomena, while others regard “facts” to
refer to the phenomena themselves. These contrasting definitions were implied
during interviews we conducted with particle physicists based at the Dutch
National Institute for Subatomic Physics (Nikhef) in Amsterdam. When asked
about the Higgs boson, one of the interviewees explained that it first was a
hypothesis, until it was measured, then “it became a fact.”* Indeed, even within
single disciplines, multiple interpretations of the concept of fact may coexist.
These different interpretations of the fact have a history. Over the past cen-
turies, the concept of fact has been modified repeatedly to serve divergent
purposes. Many contemporary features of the fact, such as its association with
truth, were not self-evident: it was a seventeenth-century invention to define facts
as true. Before then, facts could also be false.4 Furthermore, researchers only
established a link between facts and notions of subjectivity and objectivity over the
course of the nineteenth century.5 So, when the philosopher of science Ludwik
Fig. 1. “Science Is Not an Alternative Fact.” Photo taken by Lorie Shaull during the Minnesota
March for Science on April 22, 2017. Credit: Wikimedia Commons
* The physicists were Auke Pieter Colijn and Ivo van Vulpen. Transcripts of the interviews
(conducted in Amsterdam in January 2018) are available upon request.
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Fleck began his influential 1935 book Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact
by asking, “What is a fact?,” his answer—“A fact is supposed to be distinguished
from transient theories as something definite, permanent, and independent of any
subjective interpretation by the scientist. It is that which the various scientific
disciplines aim at. The critique of the methods used to establish it constitutes the
subject matter of epistemology”6—would have sounded unfamiliar to scholars and
scientists from earlier time periods. Thirteen years before Fleck, Ludwig
Wittgenstein posited in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) that “the world
is the totality of facts, not of things,” defining a fact as “what is the case.”7 The
differences between Fleck and Wittgenstein’s views are subtle, but significant. For
one thing, Fleck’s facts need to be established—his primary example being “the
fact that the so-called Wassermann reaction is related to syphilis”8—while those of
Wittgenstein are already the case. The major point that we want to convey is that
neither Fleck nor Wittgenstein’s “fact” was timeless or self-evident.9
As it turns out, the best-known literature on facts, including the books by Fleck
and Wittgenstein from which we have quoted, has been insensitive to the insight
that the concept of fact has been historically fluid, acquiring various interpreta-
tions across geographical and disciplinary boundaries. For example, Steven Shapin
and Simon Schaffer have famously described early modern practices of fact-
making, but without investigating the concept of “fact” itself.10 The same goes for
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s influential book about the construction of
scientific facts.11 Looking back at his earlier work, in 2004, Latour even
acknowledged that he had accepted “much too uncritically what matters of fact
were.” This he blamed on “remaining too faithful to the unfortunate solution
inherited from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.”12
Since the fact has been subject to many conceptual transformations, various
histories of the fact can be told. In recent years, historians of the sciences and
humanities have studied its historically fluid meaning in relation to different
knowledge practices, including but not limited to philosophy. The focus of his-
torical case studies has ranged from sixteenth-century law to nineteenth-century
chemistry, and from seventeenth-century natural history to eighteenth-century
statistics.13 In this article, we build on this historiography of the “fact” by exam-
ining how the concept of fact was used in the disciplinary context of German
physics around 1900. We focus mainly on the concepts of fact of the physicists
Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and Albert Einstein (1879–1955).
Mach and Einstein are no unfamiliar combination. The exact influence of Mach
on Einstein, as well as its development during the course of Einstein’s career, have
long been debated.14 With the benefit of hindsight, we can identify Mach’s his-
torical criticism of the mechanical worldview and the associated concepts of
absolute time and space, as most famously outlined in his The Science of
Mechanics from 1883, as heralding the relativity revolution occurring in the first
two decades of the twentieth century. Furthermore, Einstein was deeply influ-
enced by Mach’s epistemology, even though he became increasingly skeptical of
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its merit over the course of his career. In the following, we shed light on the
changing relationship between Mach and Einstein’s physics and epistemology by
comparing their use and understanding of the category fact.
Such a comparison assists the study of the modern notion of a “scientific fact,”
and how and why it should be distinguished from an “alternative fact.” This is
because Mach and Einstein’s concepts of fact were constitutional for later and
current notions, also outside of the physics discipline. Mach’s fact-oriented
empiricism was a primary source of inspiration for logical positivism and con-
ventionalism, which in turn became hugely influential in shaping twentieth-century
philosophical debates about realism, the relation between theory and experiment,
and the role and status of scientific facts.15 Einstein’s physics and philosophy, in
particular his theory of relativity and his critique of quantum mechanics, also
became an essential point of reference in such debates. What is more, Einstein
actively contributed to epistemological discussions himself.16
Half a century ago, Gerald Holton touched upon the main issue addressed by
this paper. In 1968, Holton claimed that there was a “divergence between the
conception of ‘fact’ as understood by Einstein and ‘fact’ as understood by a true
Machist.”17 According to Holton, this divergence related to the status of laws,
concepts, and principles, which Mach, unlike Einstein, systematically distinguished
from facts. In 1984, Paul Feyerabend criticized Holton’s claim; he argued that the
contrast between Mach’s and Einstein’s ideas about the nature of facts should not
be exaggerated. On many occasions, Mach used “the term ‘facts of experience’ in a
rather general way,” Feyerabend noted.18 On closer inspection, the evidence
presented by Holton and Feyerabend in support of their respective claims proves
fragile. Holton focused mostly on Einstein, and admitted that he had only “[re-
viewed] briefly the essential points of Mach’s philosophy.”19 Feyerabend’s
response relied on a more in-depth study of Mach’s work. However, he projected
his own understanding of a fact onto Mach’s writings, rather than reconstructing
Mach’s specific use of the term.20
Einstein and Mach’s concepts of fact have not been further compared since
Feyerabend assessed Holton’s claim. Here, we continue the discussion initiated by
Holton and Feyerband with the benefit of being able to take into account insights
provided by recent scholarship on the history of the fact in German physics.21
Although neither Mach nor Einstein ever formulated an explicit definition of a
fact, unlike Fleck and Wittgenstein, it proves possible to extract coherent inter-
pretations from their writings. To this end, we have taken the original German
texts as the basis of our analysis, checking these for the use of the term Tatsache(n).
Mach and Einstein used other relevant words as well, such as “Faktum” or
“Sachverhalt,” but less frequently.22
In what follows, we first discuss how, around 1800, the concept of fact rose to
prominence in German intellectual culture, particularly in the discipline of physics.
Subsequently, we focus on Mach, analyzing the meaning and role he attributed to
facts in relation to his physics. After that, we compare Mach’s concept of fact to
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Einstein’s. As it turns out, Mach and Einstein’s contrasting understandings of the
concept of fact mirrored broader epistemological tensions in the German physics
discipline around 1900.
The Origins of the Fact in German Physics
The concept of fact emerged in sixteenth-century England. It was first used by
lawyers, who interpreted a “matter of fact” as a human act or event of which the
actual occurrence was in contention. In court, a fact could be decided to be either
untrue or probable, depending on the evidence. During the seventeenth century,
the concept of fact began to be used in the study of nature as well. In contrast to
lawyers, English natural philosophers regarded facts as true in principle.23 During
its subsequent circulation into different languages and disciplines, the meaning of
the concept of fact remained fluid.
In the German-speaking context, the concept of fact was widely adopted only
around 1800, when the popularity of the then-novel terms Thatsache (translated
from the English “matter of fact”) and Faktum/Factum (from the Latin “factum”)
rapidly increased.24 Over the course of the nineteenth century, Tatsache (even-
tually spelled without the “h”) became the word most frequently used. The origins
of this neologism were in theological history, but it was soon appropriated into the
vocabularies of other knowledge domains.25
In the late-eighteenth century, prominent German naturalists, including Georg
Lichtenberg (1742–1799), adopted the concept of fact to reflect upon the methods
of Naturlehre (a knowledge domain preceding the modern discipline of “physics”
in the German-speaking tradition). Lichtenberg defined facts as real, eternally
valid, and strictly empirical. This put them in contrast to theories and hypotheses,
which he considered fallible and short-lived.26 After 1800, the contrast between
fact and theory became increasingly common. It was propagated, for example, by
Lichtenberg’s student Alexander von Humboldt, who argued that “Thatsachen are
fixed when the fleetingly improvised theoretical building has long collapsed.”27
Lichtenberg and his contemporaries identified facts as the empirical basis of sci-
entific knowledge. The establishment of facts, however, they did not consider a
goal of science proper. Lichtenberg held that the gathering of facts should always
be followed by synthesis. In his lecture notes, Lichtenberg argued that “it is useless
to find facts [Thatsachen], when one does not try to bring them in relation to one
another. We must certainly have facts, since they are the basis of science [Wis-
senschaft], but they are not science [Wissenschaft] itself.”28
Facts became particularly important in the context of discipline formation at
German universities during the beginning of the nineteenth century. The first
generation of German “physicists” started to interpret facts by themselves as
representing proper scientific knowledge. They emphasized that their novel dis-
cipline focused only on facts, which they still defined as real, eternally valid, and
strictly empirical. In so doing, they demarcated physics from the speculative
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enterprise of German idealistic philosophy (Naturfilosofie), as represented by
Friedrich Schelling and Georg Hegel. Such demarcation strategies were particu-
larly employed by experimentalists such as Gustav Magnus (1802–1870). Like
Lichtenberg, Magnus maintained a strict separation between facts, which char-
acterized physics, and theories, which belonged to mathematics.29 As historian of
science Kenneth Caneva has put it, the prevalent ideals in the early nineteenth-
century German physics community were “atheoretical.” Physicists demanded
“facts and experiments without any hypothetical interpretation,” and with as little
mathematics as possible.30
Through practical laboratory training offered by Magnus and others, these fact-
oriented, atheoretical ideals became deeply entrenched in the nineteenth-century
physical discipline.31 Not all aspiring physicists, however, could identify with a
discipline that was mainly concerned with the establishment of individual, athe-
oretical facts. In 1871, Hermann von Helmholtz lamented that his former teacher
Magnus had only focused on finding new facts, and systematically underappreci-
ated the value of mathematical theory. According to Helmholtz, this was because
he had overreacted against the speculative methods of Naturfilosofie, which were
still very influential when Magnus began to teach at the University of Berlin in the
1830s. Helmholtz recognized the many “new and often remarkable facts” that
Magnus had discovered and “brought in connection with the great fabric of sci-
ence,” but found it time to abandon “excessive empiricism which sets out to
discover facts which fit to no rule.”32 Helmholtz considered experimental and
mathematical physics, as well as facts and theories, to be in a more fluid, contin-
uous relation. In a similar vein, Magnus’s former student and laboratory assistant
August Kundt pleaded for “an extension of facts in order better to support dif-
ferent fundamental theories or to direct [theory] into new paths” during his
inaugural address at the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1889.33 Such statements
illustrate that, in the late-nineteenth century, empirically minded physicist could
focus on facts, and at the same time acknowledge the fruitfulness of (mathemat-
ical) theory. This does not imply, however, that the definition of a fact was
changing; Helmholtz and Kundt still considered facts to be atheoretical.
Mach and Einstein’s conceptions of fact must be understood in relation to this
generally perceived tension between fact and theory. Finding an appropriate
balance between the two was a pressing issue for both physicists. But as we will
show, they adopted divergent definitions of the very concepts of fact and theory.
Whereas Mach retained the traditional distinction between fact and theory, Ein-
stein did not.
Mach’s Concept of Fact
As recent research has shown, Mach was a versatile researcher.34 He was first and
foremost a physicist, but had a broad conception of his discipline. Indeed, Mach
fashioned himself as a physicist “unconstrained by the conventional barriers of the
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specialist,” as Richard Staley has argued.35 In his research as well as in his
teaching, Mach sought to connect physics to psychology and physiology, and he
approached these disciplines within one overarching epistemological framework.36
Furthermore, Mach believed that contemporary physics was to be practiced from a
“historical-critical” perspective, which is why much of his work in physics was
interspersed with epistemological reflections.37 Conversely, Mach’s epistemology
developed in the context of contemporary debates in physics about mechanics,
thermodynamics, and energy conservation.38
Mach regarded empirical observation as the primary source of scientific
knowledge, and he deemed knowledge acquired by non-experimental means
invalid. He found that observations, not speculations, should be the starting point
of physics. Still, as recent studies have shown, labels such as “positivism” and
“empiricism” do not adequately capture Mach’s epistemology.39 Mach concisely
summarized his main epistemological position during a lecture in 1882, claiming
that “the goal which [physical science] has set itself is the simplest and most
economical expression of facts.”40 To properly understand what Mach meant by
this, we need to answer two questions: What are facts, according to Mach? And
how does one express them in the most economical way? To answer these ques-
tions, we will first give a brief introduction to Mach’s epistemological vocabulary.
This is crucial, for Mach’s understanding of the term fact depended on his specific
use of other terms, in particular “sensations” and “elements.”
Elements and Sensations
Mach maintained, as Erik Banks has put it, that “the natural world is made up of
individualized events embedded in real causal–functional relations to each other.
These events and causal–functional relations are what really exist, and the rest
(objects, extended bodies, fields…) are constructed out of them.”41 Mach called
these events “elements” (Elemente). He considered such elements the fundamen-
tal building blocks of experience, and, moreover, of reality. “The very simplest
components of what we experience and live through which we do not know how to
divide further are called elements,” he explained.42 Examples of elements included
“colors, tones, pressures, spaces, [and] times.”43 In one of his personal notebooks,
Mach further explained: “Colors, space, tones etc. These are the actual realities.
There are no others.”44
The notion of “sensation” (Empfindung) was another main ingredient of
Mach’s epistemological vocabulary. Mach defined sensations as a particular kind
of elements, namely as those occurring in the nervous system.45 It may thus be said
that Mach used the terms elements and sensations to refer to the constituent parts
of the outer (physical) and the inner (psychical) world, respectively. But it would
be wrong to suppose that Mach considered elements and sensations different in
nature. Indeed, for Mach there was no principal distinction between elements and
sensations, since he regarded the dividing line between the realms of the physical
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and the psychical as indiscernible. As he put it himself: “we resolve the whole
material world into elements which at the same time are also elements of the
psychical world, and, as such, are commonly called sensations.”46 Mach’s main
reason for sometimes using the term “sensations” (instead of “elements”) was to
avoid confusion: “we only use the additional terms ‘sensations’ to describe the
elements, because most people are much more familiar with the elements in
question as sensations.”47 Despite Mach’s attempts to provide clarity, the exact
relationship between elements and sensations remained ambiguous. It is certain,
however, that Mach considered elements more fundamental than sensations.
Philosophers have paid substantial attention to the meanings of the Machian
notions of elements and sensations. Mach’s understanding of a “fact” (Tatsache or
Faktum), however, seems to have been mistaken as self-evident. Although Mach’s
interpretation of a fact closely depended on his understanding of elements and
sensations, it would be incorrect to treat Mach’s facts as synonymous with either
one of these terms, as some have done.48
Facts as Complex Combinations of Elements
According to Mach, facts were combinations of elements. He construed facts and
elements as equally real.49 He argued that “all physical facts are made up,
ultimately, of the same [sinnlichen Elementen]* (colors, pressures, spaces,
times).”50 As elements could be both physical and psychical, facts could also be
physical or psychical. Illustrative for this is Mach’s assertion that “even the wildest
dream is a fact as much as any other.”51
It seems unlikely that Mach considered the elements themselves to be facts as
well. This is because he regarded elements to be indivisible, and facts as
“complex.” More complex facts could be combinations of simpler facts, which, in
turn, could be reduced to elements. For example, the complex facts of sound and
water waves can be reduced “to the few facts of wave motion.”52 In Mach’s
opinion, the most developed sciences “are those whose facts are reducible to a few
numerable elements of like nature.”53
In the 1882 lecture in which Mach claimed that physics entailed “the simplest
and most economical expression of facts,” he also argued that facts are “exhibited”
(“klargelegt”) by experience.54 In another lecture, Mach spoke about the
revelation (“Offenbarung”) of facts.55 These statements give the impression that
Mach considered facts to be revealed or discovered, which would mean that,
according to Mach, they exist independently from their observation. The
statements can also be read differently, however. Mach might also have meant
that senses produce facts, and hence that facts are the product of experience. Such
* In the cited source the phrase “sinnlichen Elemente” has been translated, understandably
but confusingly, as “sensational elements.” “Sensory elements” would have been a less
confusing translation.
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a reading is endorsed by Mach’s recognition of the senses as the source of facts:
“We know of only one source of immediate revelation of scientific facts—our
senses.”56 But such a reading becomes problematic again when noting that Mach
defined observation as the “adaptation of thoughts to facts.”57 This grants facts at
least some degree of autonomy, like elements. If we put aside these ambiguities,
we can establish that Mach in any case considered facts as inextricably linked to
the senses.
Due to the complexity of facts, the reproduction (“Nachbildung”) of a fact in
thought during observation is never perfect. Mach frequently stressed that a fact
can never be represented in its entirety, and that observation always renders an
incomplete representation of a fact. Hence, the exact appearance of a fact in
thought heavily depends on the way that it is observed, and also on the observer.
In Mach’s own words: “What aspects of a fact are taken notice of, will
consequently depend upon circumstances, or even on the caprice of the observer.
Hence there is always opportunity for the discovery of new aspects of the fact.”58
Let us try to further clarify Mach’s understanding of a fact by giving some
examples of what he considered facts and what not. First, in an 1891 essay in The
Monist, Mach compared the “motions of atoms” to the “green of trees.” In the
latter, he said, “I see a (sensory) fact, in the former a Gedankending, a thing of
thought.”59 For Mach, the idea of an atom had little scientific value. He considered
it a product of speculation, rather than a (representation of a) fact. The green of
the trees, on the other hand, he did consider a fact, because it could be directly
registered by the senses. Interestingly, Mach left open the possibility that facts
have a “nucleus” which lies beyond the reach of experience: “One might be of the
opinion, say, with respect to physics, that the portrayal of the sense-given facts is of
less importance than the atoms, forces, and laws which form, so to speak, the
nucleus of the sense-given facts.”60 Yet he argued that it was not the task of
physicists to speculate about this nucleus, or to try to determine the cause or object
behind the appearance of a given fact: “unbiased reflexion discloses that every
practical and intellectual need is satisfied the moment our thoughts have acquired
the power to represent the facts of the senses completely. Such representation,
consequently, is the end and aim of physics.”61
Other examples of facts in Mach’s work were “the augmentation of the D-line
in the solar spectrum by the interposition of a sodium lamp,”62 “a real spectrum-
image … with Fraunhofer lines occurring in it,” and “the charges of conductors
residing on the surface.”63 These examples indicate that Mach did not demand
facts to be formulated exclusively in terms of elements, as long as they could be
reduced to them. Put differently, facts could be interspersed with theoretical tools.
In Mach’s words, “facts … are extended and enriched, and ultimately again
simplified, by conceptual handling.”64
We now have a grasp of how Mach interpreted the concept of fact and where
the ambiguities in his interpretation lay. To Mach, facts were real, complex
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combinations of elements, and given by the senses (we have noted the ambiguity
of this particular feature of a Machian fact). During observation, facts were
reproduced in thought, yet only partially due to their complexity. We showed that
Mach allowed facts to be supplemented by “conceptual handling.” Although the
latter might suggest otherwise, Mach did systematically distinguish between fact
and theory.65
Theory Orders Facts Economically
Since an individual observer can only experience a limited number of facts, Mach
insisted on the importance of communication between individuals. “By commu-
nication, the experience of many persons individually acquired at first, is collected
in one,” he argued. “The communication of knowledge and the necessity which
everyone feels of managing his stock of experience with the least expenditure of
thought, compel us to put our knowledge in economical forms.”66 In order for
natural knowledge to be shared, facts must thus be presented in an efficient,
manageable, or “economical” manner. To this end, Mach attributed an important
role to theory.
For Mach, theory meant the adjustment of fact-representing thoughts to each
other, in order to find more general representations of facts, for example in the
form of natural laws. “To save the labor of instruction and of acquisition,” Mach
argued, “concise, abridged description is sought. This is really all that natural laws
are.”67 Mach defined the ideal theory as “a complete and systematic represen-
tation of the facts,” but denied that such a theory was ever fully attainable, given
the limited accessibility of facts.68 As science progressed, the ideal was only
approached asymptotically. As examples of near-to-ideal theories, Mach men-
tioned d’Alembert’s equations, “which comprise all possible dynamical facts, or
the equations of Fourier which comprise all conceivable facts of thermal
conduction.”69
Mach stressed the limitations of theoretical tools, despite their indispensable
role of ordering facts economically. However valuable to science, theoretical tools
were inevitably contingent and arbitrary, unlike the real elements and facts they
aimed to describe. In Mach’s opinion, “theories are like dry leaves which fall away
when they have long ceased to be the lungs of the tree of science.”70 With regard
to laws, he claimed: “in reality, the law always contains less than the fact itself,
because it does not reproduce the fact as a whole, but only in that aspect of it
which is important to us, the rest being either intentionally or from necessity
omitted.”71 About concepts, Mach made similar remarks: “Our physical concepts,
however close they come to the facts, must not be regarded as complete and final
expression of these facts.”72
These comments about the limits of theoretical tools illustrate once more that,
for Mach, facts were complex and multifaceted. They could be represented only
partially, be it by observation or theoretical intervention. In The Science of
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Mechanics,Mach explained this as follows: “A rule, reached by the observation of
facts, cannot possibly embrace the entire fact, in all its infinite wealth, in all its
inexhaustible manifoldness [Mannigfaltigkeit]; on the contrary, it can furnish only
a rough outline of the fact, one-sidedly emphasizing the feature that is of
importance for the given technical (or scientific) aim in view.”73 Thus, according to
Mach, theories were only capable of expressing a limited aspect of the facts.
Following these definitions of fact and theory, Mach regularly emphasized “how
important it is to distinguish sharply between concept and law on one side and fact
on the other.”74
Even though Mach made a clear distinction between fact and theory, like most
physicists in the nineteenth-century German context, he acknowledged that the
two crucially depended on one another. For Mach, facts alone had little scientific
value, since the aim of science and physics was the economic ordering of facts. This
ordering, in turn, could only be achieved by means of theorizing. Although Mach
might not have believed that theories directly represented the real, he did believe
they had an essential function. Therefore, Mach’s reputation as a positivist only
interested in facts is an oversimplification.
The close interdependence of fact and theory in Mach’s epistemology becomes
further apparent from his understanding of “principles.” Mach considered facts
and principles as intimately related. In the Science of Mechanics, Mach noted that
principles were “merely … the ascertainment and establishment of a fact.”75 The
principle of virtual displacements, for instance, followed instinctively from
experience. It was a generalization of the recurring fact that “heavy bodies, of
themselves, move only downwards.” As Mach explained, “there is contained in the
principle of virtual displacements simply the recognition of a fact that was
instinctively familiar to us long previously, only that we had not apprehended it so
precisely and clearly.”76 In the first chapters of the Science of Mechanics, Mach
traced the historical origins of some other basic principles of statics, dynamics, and
mechanics. He consistently emphasized how principles that seemingly relied on a
priori arguments had actually been grounded in experience. Mach also argued that
once a principle had been established, it could function as a tool in the process of
understanding and explaining through economical description, similar to other
theoretical tools such as laws and concepts, and unlike the facts ascertained by the
principle. In sum, Machian principles played a mediating role between fact and
theory: they were closely aligned to experiential facts, while at the same time
contributing to their economical description.
In Mach’s view, the ideal theoretical construct was a direct expression of facts.
Mach believed he had reached this ideal for the concept of mass. In the Science of
Mechanics, he presented a definition of mass relying on the mutual attraction of
bodies. He portrayed this conception of mass as purely factual: “in the concept of
mass no theory of any kind whatever is contained, but simply a fact of
experience.”77 But even this atheoretical concept remained principally fallible,
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Mach conceded: “it is very improbable, but not impossible, that it will be shaken in
the future.”78 Generally, Mach argued that any theoretical description, even the
most “economical” ones, such as his concept of mass or the mathematically simple
laws of d’Alembert and Fourier, “may be deranged by a single newly discovered
fact.”79 Of all theoretical tools, Mach seems to have had most trust in the
durability of principles, as these corresponded most closely to fact. Yet, even
principles were fundamentally imperfect, Mach warned, since the intuitive
knowledge that they expressed “is just as fallible as the distinctly conscious.”80
Toward a Theoretical Physics
Mach’s views on the relation between fact and theory resembled broader opinions
in late-nineteenth-century physics. Mach’s epistemology, although unique in its
specific elaboration, was heavily indebted to how the generation of German-
speaking experimental physicists before Mach, including Lichtenberg and Magnus,
had defined their emerging discipline. Indeed, Mach conformed to their identifi-
cation of physics as a non-speculative and fact-oriented discipline. Erik Banks has
rightfully pointed out that Mach’s “anti-metaphysics (so often associated with
Mach himself) was actually the rallying cry of the generation before Mach in their
crusade against Naturphilosophie.”81
Furthermore, Mach was a proponent of what John Heilbron has identified as
fin-de-sie`cle “descriptionism,” which concerned a “withdrawal from big questions
and relaxation of claims to knowledge of truth.”82 In Mach’s view, as reconstructed
by Heilbron, science “had nothing to do with truth, but only with precise, eco-
nomical and simple description.”83 In a similar vein, Mach’s colleague physicist
Gustav Kirchhoff (1824–1887) emphasized that mathematical physics was “just a
matter of indicating the phenomena which take place, not of determining their
causes.”84 Heilbron and others have demonstrated that such views found wide
appeal among physicists around 1900, throughout Western Europe.85
Descriptionists like Mach and Kirchhoff did not seek underlying causes of
observed facts; their primary aim was to represent and order them as efficiently as
possible. To this end, they used different techniques. In the case of Mach,
descriptionist practices involved experimental work. Mach’s photographic exper-
iments on shock waves, for example, were representative for his desire to “lay bare
facts” as directly as possible.86 As Mach explained, the photographic study of
shock waves enabled to “exhibit … the individual phases of a movement … to our
perception as slowly as we like.”87 A second kind of descriptionist practice char-
acterizing Mach’s work concerned the clarification of physical concepts, as in the
case of his redefinition of the concept of mass, or of “temperature.”88 A third
descriptionist practice—one in which Mach personally was less involved but which
was championed by Kirchhoff and Heinrich Hertz—concerned the mathematiza-
tion of fact-ordering physical concepts, in order to liberate them from
metaphysical components.89 In the preface to the later republication of his 1871
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lecture on the history of the principle of the conservation of work, Mach praised
Kirchhoff’s physics and epistemology, which he regarded as similar to his own. “It
was a ray of hope,” Mach wrote, “when Kirchhoff pronounced, in 1874, the
problem of mechanics to be the complete and simplest description of motions, and
this nearly corresponded to the economical representation of facts.”90
Mach’s epistemology thus aligned with those of his contemporaries. Can the
same be said of his particular interpretation of the concept of fact? Above we
established that early nineteenth-century German physicists made a conceptual
distinction between fact and theory; they considered facts as real and lasting, but
theories as fallible and short lived. Mach adopted this distinction, and so did the
majority of German-speaking physicists in the late-nineteenth century. Hertz, for
example, in an 1888 commentary on electric force (which he deemed an obsolete
concept), argued that “the facts here communicated are true independently of the
theory, and the theory here developed depends for its support more upon the facts
than upon the explanations which accompany it.”91
So, Mach’s concept of fact matched broader trends in the disciplinary context of
German physics. The details of Mach’s use of the term fact, however, were less
common; the Machian fact was embedded within a unique conceptual framework,
including idiosyncratic notions such as elements and sensations. Furthermore,
Mach’s emphasis on the complexity of facts was more reminiscent of ideas
prevalent in nineteenth-century German historiography than in physics. Like
Mach, German historians such as Leopold von Ranke and Wilhelm von Humboldt
encouraged the study of historical facts from multiple sides, to represent them as
completely as possible, and to extend them in thought. The difference was that
historians defined facts as complexes of human rather than natural events (or
Machian elements).92
Around 1900, the descriptionist views so popular among German experimen-
talists were losing ground. This was due to the rising status of theoretical physics, a
novel subdiscipline that incorporated elements from both experimental and
mathematical research traditions.93 The new physics brought along new episte-
mologies. Prominent theoretical physicists like Max Planck (1858–1947)
proclaimed that the ultimate aim of science was not to represent facts as efficiently
as possible, but to find underlying causes and universally valid laws, if necessary by
using speculative methods and the power of imagination.94 This placed Planck
directly opposite Mach and his conception of proper scientific method, and more
in agreement with Mach’s contemporary Helmholtz.95 For Mach, the real was
confined to actual “elements” and combinations of elements (“facts”). Planck, on
the other hand, defined the real in terms of a “world-picture” (Weltbild), which
was not to be found in Machian facts or elements, but only in universally valid laws
and principles.
In 1908, Planck openly contested the still-influential views of his Austrian
colleague. In a lecture entitled The Unity of the Physical World-Picture, which was
a direct attack on Mach and his epistemology, Planck asked rhetorically: “Is there
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today a single physicist worthy of serious consideration who doubts the reality of
the energy principle? Rather, the recognition of this reality is nowadays a pre-
requisite for winning any scientific respect.” About Mach’s philosophy, he
remarked that it “does not affect the essence of natural science. This is because the
outstanding characteristic of all scientific research—the demand for a constant
world picture, independent of changing times and peoples—is alien to it.”96
Indeed, Mach had at one point argued that the energy principle “consists in a
special form of viewing facts, but its domain of application is not unlimited,”
thereby questioning its universality.97
Initially, Einstein chose Mach’s side, for example by calling Planck’s criticism
“unjust” in 1913.98 In subsequent years, however, he came to embrace many of
Planck’s points of criticism.99 Like Planck and other theoretical physicists, Ein-
stein became increasingly convinced that mathematically invented theories could
directly represent reality, a notion that was reinforced by the completion of gen-
eral relativity in 1915.100 In the following section, we show that Einstein’s
rapprochement to Planck’s views and his growing aversion to Machian episte-
mology were accompanied by the development of a fundamentally different
understanding of the term fact.
Einstein’s Concept of Fact
Initially, Einstein complied with the epistemologies of German experimentalists
like Lichtenberg, Magnus, and Mach. He distinguished between “observable fact”
(“beobachtbare Tatsache”) and the “merely conceptual” (“bloss begriffliches”).101
The young Einstein would generally stress that any theory had to correspond with
the facts while adding to that, in Machian fashion, that such correspondence would
never be perfect: “Of course, an exact agreement with the facts is out of the
question,” he noted in 1906, while discussing recent developments in molecular
theory.102 In 1914, during his inaugural lecture at the Prussian Academy of Sci-
ences, Einstein emphasized the importance of principles in physics. He did so
while defining these principles as inductions from “complexes of facts” (Kom-
plexen von Erfahrungsthatsachen).103 In another lecture at the Prussian Academy
in 1921, entitled Geometry and Experience, Einstein expressed the opinion that
mathematical theories were never direct representations reality: “As far as the
propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they
are certain, they do not refer to reality.”104
All this seems perfectly compatible with Mach’s economical approach to phy-
sics. Yet, Einstein’s alignment with Mach proved inconsistent. In contrast to Mach
and like Planck, Einstein attached much value to the idea that physical theories
and principles could be “real,” even early in his career. In the 1914 inaugural
lecture, for example, he claimed that it was possible that “theoretical principles
correspond to reality.”105 Furthermore, Einstein maintained that theories and
principles could also be rationally invented and then tested experimentally, instead
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of the other, inductive way around; he argued that theories of gravitation should
be confronted with experimental facts only after they had been mathematically
invented.106
Over the course of his career, Einstein embraced the potential of mathematical
theory to fully grasp reality.107 Important backgrounds of Einstein’s shift toward
this position were his campaign against quantum mechanics and his pursuit of a
unified field theory. Such a mathematically simple theory he depicted as an
unavoidable alternative to the messy, experiment-driven, and probabilistic theory
of quantum mechanics.108 The more deeply Einstein became involved in his uni-
fication project and the more heavily he criticized quantum mechanics, the less he
came to appreciate the heuristic role of experiment. Indeed, Einstein regarded
quantum theory to be superficial and uninspired precisely because it was designed
to fit experimental outcomes.109 In 1925, furthermore, Einstein wrote to his friend
Paul Ehrenfest that “inductive means will never get you to a sensible theory.”110 In
1933, he insisted that “any attempt logically to derive the basic concepts and laws
of mechanics from the ultimate data of experience is doomed to failure.”111 Some
years later, in 1936, Einstein blamed nineteenth-century physicists, including
Mach, for their “failure to understand” that “there is no inductive method which
could lead to the fundamental concepts of physics.”112
Facts and Principles
Clearly, Einstein abandoned his faith in Mach’s economical, fact-ordering
approach to physics later in his career. Meanwhile, Einstein had also appropriated
an understanding of the concept of fact fundamentally different from that of his
Austrian colleague. This is most evident from Einstein’s synonymous treatment of
facts and principles. For example, in 1916, while introducing his theory of relativity
to a wider audience, Einstein referred to “the fact of the equality of inertial and
gravitational mass, which is strongly confirmed empirically.”113
In a 1918 letter to his friend Michele Besso, “a loyal Machist” who had
introduced Einstein to Mach’s work,114 Einstein explicitly blurred the distinction
between fact and theory (including principles) that had been propagated by Mach.
Einstein seemed upset that Besso, one of his dearest friends, had accused him of
developing a speculative theory that was not directly connected to facts. He
explained why he found that the theory of relativity was not based on speculation,
but on facts. In doing so, he broadened the scope of what he considered factual,
ostensibly without being aware of it. “On rereading your last letter,” Einstein
wrote to Besso, “I discovered something that downright annoys me: speculation
allegedly had revealed itself to be superior to empiricism.” He continued: “In this
regard you are thinking of the development of the theory of relativity. But I find
that this development teaches something different that is almost the opposite,
namely, that in order to be reliable, a theory must be built upon generalizable
facts.” Einstein then listed some “old examples” of theories and the facts that they
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had been built upon: the “main theorems of thermodynamics [are based] on the
impossibility of the perpetuum mobile. Mechanics on the empirically explored law
of inertia. Kin[etic] gas theory on the equivalency of heat and mech[anical] energy
(also historically).” The theory of relativity, according to Einstein, had been
derived from the facts of “the constancy of the velocity of light [and] Maxwell’s
equations for the vacuum, which on their part are based on empirical foundations.
Relativity with regard to unif[orm] translation is an observed fact. General
relativity: Equivalency of inertial and gravitational mass.”115 In 1921, likewise,
Einstein called “the constancy of speed of light” and “the equivalence of inertial
and ponderable mass” “very definite facts.”116
The above examples indicate that Einstein was developing a different, broader
concept of fact than Mach and his contemporaries. By the beginning of the 1920s,
Einstein seemed to consider facts and principles interchangeable, interpreting
both as general results of experience. In 1919, Einstein labelled the impossibility of
the perpetuum mobile neither a fact nor a principle, but an “allgemeine
Erfahrungsresultat.”117 Strikingly, the first two examples listed by Einstein in his
letter to Besso also figured prominently in Mach’s work. In the 1871 lecture, for
example, Mach lengthily discussed the impossibility of perpetual motion. Like
Einstein, Mach emphasized that the impossibility of constructing a perpetuum
mobile had not been derived from a priori speculation, but from experience. In
contrast to Einstein, however, Mach consistently labelled it as a principle (“Satz”
or “Princip”) rather than a fact.118 As we have argued above, for Mach principles
and facts were, though closely related, fundamentally distinct. Einstein’s under-
standing of the concept of fact had thus become more inclusive than Mach’s, and
included the generalized descriptions of experience that Mach would have
referred to as principles. Into what exactly had it developed?
Three Interpretations of Fact
We have found that Einstein used the term fact in at least three different ways.
None of these exactly mirrored the conceptions of Mach and his late-nineteenth-
century peers. First, Einstein employed the term fact, usually in the singular form,
when referring to a principle based on experience that he considered a universally
valid representation of reality, as in his 1918 letter to Besso. But on many other
occasions as well, we find examples such as “the fact that the gravitational and
inertial masses are identical,” or “the fact that weak disturbing forces are able to
produce alterations of any magnitude in the physical condition of a system.”119 In
1949, still, Einstein wrote about “the fact of the equality of inert and heavy mass,
i.e., the fact of the independence of the gravitational acceleration of the nature of
the falling substance.”120 As we argued above, this was at odds with conceptions of
Mach and his fellow descriptionists, who never assumed principles, let alone other
theoretical tools, to be universally valid. So, while Mach and Einstein could both
use the term fact to refer to something they considered to directly represent
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reality, they had different ideas about what met this demand. As evidenced by the
polemic between Mach and Planck, this was not so much a typical difference
between Mach and Einstein, but reflected a general tension in German physics
around 1900.
Second, Einstein referred to facts, in the plural, when denoting a set of
individual sense experiences to which a certain theory needed to correspond.121
While this did conform to previously prevalent interpretations, Einstein ascribed a
less primary role to these kinds of facts than did his nineteenth-century
predecessors. This was because he thought experience was not a good starting
point for developing a theory that would correspond to reality. From the 1930s
onwards, moreover, when referring to individual sense experiences, Einstein
generally preferred to use phrases such as “Erlebnismaterial,” “Sinnen-Erleb-
nisse,” or the “erfahrungsma¨ssig Gegebenen,” rather than “Tatsachen.”122
Third, Einstein used the term “fact” to refer to something beyond discussion.
This could be a physical concept or experimental outcome, but also a general
statement, such as: “It is a fact [Tatsache] that Mach has had tremendous impact
upon our generation of natural scientists.”123 In Einstein’s work—especially in
English translations, but also in the original German—one finds many passages in
which the term “fact” (“Tatsache,” “Faktum,” or “Sachverhalt”) is not used
reflectively and in relation to physics. Although English translations of his work
might give a different impression, Mach rarely used the term in such an
unreflective way.124 Apart from a few exceptions, Mach systematically utilized the
term fact (Thatsache) to reflect upon the methods of his discipline, just like other
nineteenth-century physicists. Einstein’s threefold interpretation of the term fact
indicates that he applied the concept not just alternatively, but also less
systematically than did Mach.
Conclusion
Despite his growing aversion to Mach’s epistemology, Mach’s work taught Ein-
stein many lessons. To name one, Einstein recognized Mach’s insight that even the
most fundamental concepts of physics were historical in nature, which implied that
they were not unchangeable. In his 1916 eulogy for Mach, Einstein phrased this
insight as follows: “Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things can easily
attain an authority over us such that we forget their worldly origin and take them
as immutably given.… It is not at all idle play when we are trained to analyze the
entrenched concepts, and point out the circumstances that promoted their justi-
fication and usefulness and how they evolved from the experience at hand.”125
Einstein had in mind foundational concepts such as inertia, space, and time, which
had long been regarded as unalterable foundations of the mechanical world view
that Mach had criticized. He may also have thought about physical concepts of
heat and energy, the histories of which Mach had studied extensively. Einstein
most likely did not have in mind the concept of fact.
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Yet, the Machian lesson about the historicity of concepts also applies to
epistemological ones, including the fact. In this study we have aimed to demon-
strate that Einstein and Mach used and interpreted this concept differently. The
difference became increasingly pronounced over the course of Einstein’s career,
as he developed an increasing aversion to inductive empiricism, which he asso-
ciated with Mach’s economical approach to physics. As Einstein and other
theoretical physicists gained confidence in the potential of mathematical theory to
correspond directly to reality, his understanding of the concept of fact shifted: it
came to comprise the domain of the theoretical as well as the empirical. By
dissolving the long-standing distinction between fact and theory, Einstein placed
himself outside of the disciplinary tradition of nineteenth-century physics that
Mach’s epistemology had been an expression of. The contrast we have found
between Einstein’s and Mach’s interpretations indicates that the concept of fact
continued to transform after it had claimed its place in the German physics dis-
cipline. Given Mach’s lessons on the historicity of scientific concepts and the
tremendous changes in the foundations of physics in this period, this cannot come
as a surprise.
To be able to determine to what extent this contrast between Mach and Ein-
stein really resembled general trends, we encourage further study into the history
of the fact, both within and beyond the boundaries of the German physics disci-
pline. Clues for such further study can be found in the observations of a well-
known follower of Mach, the logical positivist philosopher Rudolf Carnap (1891–
1970). In 1966, Carnap proposed to distinguish more carefully between “facts,”
which he defined as “particular events,” and “laws,” which he defined as “universal
statements.” Implicitly referring to the historicity of these notions, Carnap
observed that their meaning had become blurred in recent scientific discourse:
Scientists often refer to universal statements—or rather to what is expressed by
such statements—as “facts.” They forget that the word “fact” was originally
applied (and we shall apply it exclusively in this sense) to singular, particular
occurrences. If a scientist is asked about the law of thermal expansion, he may
say: “Oh, thermal expansion. That is one of the familiar, basic facts of physics.”
In a similar way, he may speak of the fact that heat is generated by an electric
current, the fact that magnetism is produced by electricity, and so on. These are
sometimes considered familiar “facts” of physics. To avoid misunderstandings,
we prefer not to call such statements “facts.” Facts are particular events. “This
morning in the laboratory, I sent an electric current through a wire coil with an
iron body inside it, and I found that the iron body became magnetic.” That is a
fact unless, of course, I deceived myself in some way. However, if I was sober, if
it was not too foggy in the room, and if no one has tinkered secretly with the
apparatus to play a joke on me, then I may state as a factual observation that
this morning the sequence of events occurred.
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When we use the word “fact,” we will mean it in the singular sense in order
to distinguish it clearly from universal statements. Such universal statements
will be called “laws” even when they are as elementary as the law of thermal
expansion.126
We have quoted Carnap so extensively since his observations directly touch upon
the historical transformation of the fact that we have aimed to capture in this
study. Most probably, Mach would have agreed with Carnap’s call to distinguish
more carefully between fact and law. Einstein, on the other hand, conflated these
notions, exactly in the way that Carnap described. Moreover, Carnap’s analysis
suggests that the conceptual transformation from facts as singular events bound to
a certain time and place, as in the case of Mach, to facts as universal statements, as
in the case of Einstein, resembled broader trends in early twentieth-century
science.
We began this article by noting that some consider the inevitability of scientific
facts a precondition of scientific authority (as in figure 1). Histories of the fact,
including this one, have questioned that premise, by showing that there never was
a single preferred interpretation of a fact; multiple concepts of fact have developed
and co-existed over the past centuries. To those considering the meaning of a fact
self-evident, this may be a distressing message. But it may also create opportu-
nities. We think it is important that those relying on the authority of scientific facts
reflect on what facts can be and what not, instead of assuming, unduly, that this is
self-evident. What does a scientific fact mean today? Are facts complex, as Mach
assumed, or simple? Do facts represent singular events or universal statements?
Are they empirical or theoretical, or can they perhaps be both? Regardless of the
different answers given to these questions in different disciplinary contexts, we
maintain that reflection on and openness about current notions of fact is vital in
confronting the present-day, anti-scientific politics of alternative facts. It creates
the opportunity to make clear what distinguishes scientific facts from alternative
facts.
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